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In the late 1990s, several large Japanese banks failed for the first time in its postwar history. As the
financial environment was deteriorating further, several remaining banks decided to merge among
themselves, presumably, to make their operations more efficient to avoid failures. This paper defines,
calculates and analyzes the distance to default (DD), a concept of credit risk in corporate finance, of
Japanese large banks. The DD helps us to answer a question whether mergers in the late 1990s and
2000s made the merged banks financially more robust as intended. The novelty of the paper is to develop
a method of analyzing the DD for banks that experience a merger, and to apply the method to the Japanese
banking data. Our findings include: (1) A merged bank fundamentally inherits financial soundness
of pre-merged banks, without adding special value from the merger. A merger of sound (unsound)
banks produced a sound (unsound, respectively) merged financial institution; and (2) In some cases,
a merged bank experienced a negative DD right after the merger. The findings are consistent with
a view that a primary objective of a merger was to take advantage of the perceived too-big-to-fail policy,
rather than to pursue a radical reform. Another interpretation is that mergers with intention of enhancing
efficiency resulted in failed implementation of true operational efficiency, such as quick integration
of computer operation systems and elimination of duplicating branches.
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The Japanese banking sector went through tumultuous years from the early 1990s to 
2003; first, failures of small to medium-size financial institutions in the first half of 
1990s; second, the failures of major institutions in 1997; and another rush of big 
failures in 2003. It was only since 2005 that Japanese financial institutions have 
regained financial strength, and the risk of systemic failure has receded. During the 
difficult years between 1997 and 2003, many banks attempted several methods to 
enhance their capital bases, as capital was constantly eroded by losses from 
nonperforming loans (NPLs) and declining stock prices. One way that began to 
enhance capital was a merger that took advantage of operational synergy and scale 
economies. In fact, mergers of very large banks took place in Japan, most likely to 
avert failures due to a lack of capital. The objective of this paper is to evaluate 
whether a merger during this period indeed helped the involved banks move away 
from the abyss of failures, or at least so perceived by investors. 
Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank (formerly known as Mitsui Bank) 
announced a merger on April 1, 2001. This was quite significant because the two 
banks were, respectively, the core member of the traditional enterprise groups 
(descendants of prewar zaibatsu conglomerates). On August 20, 1999 Fuji, DKB, and 
IBJ announced a three way merger and a reorganization plan to create a financial 
group with specialized subsidiary organizations, commercial banking, investment 
banking, and trust banking. Sanwa and Tokai Banks, each having regional strength, 
announced their merger on March 14, 2000. These mergers can be regarded as a direct 
response of these banks to the banking crisis of 1997-98. 
After several years of seemingly tranquil conditions, another financial crisis 
struck in 2002-03 when the bank regulator tightened standards in assessing and  3
classifying NPLs and the use of deferred tax assets as part of capital, and introduced a 
requirement for reserves for NPLs. The effects of such regulatory tightening proved 
dire for many banks. In May 2003, for example, Resona Bank was determined to have 
failed and subsequently taken over by the government due to insufficient capital. In 
fact, many banks showed huge deficits following the regulatory tightening. 
It was only after 2005 that the Japanese banks regained financial profitability 
and strength. Major financial groups in the Japanese banking sector posted positive net 
profits for the accounting years from 2005 to 2007 and they have completed repaying 
government injected funds that flowed into the predecessors of financial groups in 
1998 and 1999. The capital adequacy ratio has improved far above 8%, and the NPL 
ratio now lower than 5%  by  2008.    
  Traditionally, the government policy separated financial service industries into 
specialized segments and did not allow financial consolidation across segmentation.    
Commercial banking, trust banking, long-term credit banking, securities, and 
insurance had to be operated separately and independently. The Antimonopoly Law of 
1949 prohibited financial holding companies as well as general holding companies for 
five decades then it was revised in 1997. The revised Antimonopoly Law and the 
Banking Law of 1981 opened the way for full financial integration across financial 
segments via financial holding companies (FHCs), a parent of different financial 
institutions.
1 All major Japanese banks are now under these FHCs and they are listed 
on market and report consolidated financial statements. Due to consolidations 
sometimes across the segmentation boundary, most banks’ balance sheets are not 
                                                  
1  Under the new Article 9 of the Antimonopoly law, the establishment and operation of a 
holding company is permitted. Along with the amendment of the Banking Law in 1998, 
Japanese banks could establish holding companies and become subsidiaries of them. Most 
holding companies in the banking sector then changed into financial holdings.  4
directly comparable before and after respective mergers. Our analysis carefully 
examines the comparable balance sheets, as much as possible.   
  High on the list of primary motives for a merger of financial institutions, 
many cite reduction in costs and enhancement of revenues, taking advantage of scale 
economies.  According to the Group of Ten (2001) report, the most important forces 
encouraging consolidation are improvement in information technology, financial 
deregulation, globalization of markets, and increased shareholder pressure for 
financial performance. That is, consolidations were part of strategic management.  
Improvement in competitiveness and policy implications were analyzed by several 
papers. Calomiris and Karceski (1998) and Calomiris (1999) were a survey of earlier 
study of bank consolidations and categorized the literature based on type of the 
research. 
  As Ito and Harada (2005, 2006) examined, market assessment and evaluations 
of Japanese banks went down sharply in the 1990s. Their stock prices fell more than 
the market average, and the so-called Japan premium emerged after 1997. The Japan 
premium was found to have responded most to news about bank failures and disclosed 
losses (see Peek and Rosengren (1998)). However even after their mergers, 
evaluations in the markets did not improve, and low evaluations prompted some to 
question whether mergers have made Japanese banks healthier, and whether their 
soundness has improved.   
It was speculated in informed media that Japanese banks chose mergers in 
order to rescue weaker banks. Only a few academic papers existed to evaluate 
quantitatively the financial effect of mergers. Traditional methods of examining the 
effectiveness of mergers include comparing the pre- and post-merger ratios of 
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operation costs, per-employee profits, and capital. Most traditional methods require 
long enough data points for quantitative analysis.  Also those analyses would be 
backward-looking at the same time.   
One popular method in the existing literature is to compare stock prices of 
merged banks. The stock prices reflect market expectations of future performances so 
comparing their prior to and following the merger may be a good way to make 
assessments. However, due to their mergers, most bank prices are not directly 
comparable before and after mergers. For example, the pre-merger stock price and 
post-merger stock price have different units. So items in financial statements changed 
due to mergers and unreported intra-group transactions making analyzing subsidiaries 
(financial institutions under the parent) difficult. Additionally, merger accounting 
employed in Japan differed from that used in other countries. The purchase method is 
standardized, but most mergers in Japan use the pooling-of-interests method.
2 
  To overcome the difficulties mentioned above, we propose to use the concept 
of the distance to default (DD) as a method to evaluate the pre- and post-merger 
performances. The DD in the paper is a structural approach which is based on Merton 
(1974)’s model and Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model.  The method is 
forward-looking and overcome difficulties of non-comparability of stock prices due to 
restructuring associated with mergers. 
  Our main findings will be that mergers of Japanese banks did not make them 
                                                  
2   There are two methods for reporting for financial statement of mergers: the 
pooling-of-interest method and the purchase accounting method. Under the pooling-of-interest 
method, the balance sheets of a company in the merger are simply added together with the book 
values of their net assets without indicating which entity was the “purchaser” and which was the 
“purchased". When this method is used, it becomes difficult to tell who is buying whom or to 
determine how to evaluate the transactions. With the purchase method, one company is 
identified as the buyer. The buyer records the assets of the company being acquired on its books 
at the price it actually paid.  6
financially healthier. This result confirms the suspicions that Japanese banks did not 
become healthy after their mergers. Adding two weak banks would not produce a 
strong  bank.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the Japanese 
banking sector performance over the past 15 years. Section 3 describes the DD 
methodology and reviews the DD application to banks. We create two types of 
hypothetical banks, one is called as the Benchmark bank and the other one is called as 
a hypothetical bank in which balance sheets and stock prices prior to a merger is 
combined in section 4. in order to compare the DD before and after the mergers. The 
empirical results are presented in the latter half of section 4. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. The Japanese banking sector performance, 1990-2005   
This section reviews the history of bank failures and consolidations in Japan for the 
period between 1990 and 2005, as well as the literature on the performance of 
Japanese banks. Japanese stock prices and land prices tripled and quadrupled in the 
second half of the 1980s. The stock price index peaked on the last business day of 
1989, and land prices peaked about one year later. They then plummeted from 1990 to 
1992. No one knew at the time that the declining trend would continue until 2003.   
The bursting of the bubble that caused stock price declines across-the-board 
and causing many bank loans non-performing made bank profit turn negative and 
eroded bank capital substantially. Actual realized losses and prospective losses that 
require reserves to be accumulated cause sharp decline in bank capital among all 
Japanese banks. According to the Basle capital adequacy standard, 
internationally-active banks have to maintain a capital ratio of 8% to the risk-adjusted  7
asset. In November 1997, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (Takugin), one of the then 
twenty big banks, failed citing eroded capital and diminished liquidity. In the same 
month, one of the big four securities firms, Yamaichi Securities, also failed after the 
revelation of large previously unreported losses. Two other financial institutions failed 
in the same month. This raised the sense of crisis, and in March 1998, the government 
injected public funds to help raise capital adequacy ratios of major banks.   
Despite the efforts to stabilize the financial system, two large banks—the 
Long-term Credit Bank (LTCB) and Nippon Credit Bank (NCB)—were found to be 
under-capitalized and were nationalized in 1998, as the aggressive action by FSA 
became possible by a newly introduced law. More public money had to spend to 
takeover, restructure, and sell to the new owner of these two banks. More public funds 
were injected as preferred stocks to supposedly sound banks in March 1999.   
These developments, especially takeover of LTCB and NCB, sent an 
unmistakable signal to surviving banks that a lack of capital may result in sudden 
death, brought about by either the market or the regulator. Large banks attempted 
various ways to increase capital. Under such circumstances, a financially weak bank 
with less than sufficient capital can seek to merge with a stronger bank with a 
sufficient capital buffer. The merged bank may take advantage of scale economies in 
operation, cutting down operating costs. Expecting higher net earnings of the future, 
the stock market may favorably price the stock of a merged bank immediately after the 
merger (or so the bank hoped). However, Hirota and Tsutsui (1999), covering the data 
up to 1994, find interesting implications for economies of scale. They examine the 
risk-cost hypothesis of Japanese banks and find the estimates of scale elasticities 
become smaller as the bank becomes large.  They show that Japanese large banks, 
before mergers, had already exploited the gain from the scale of economies.    8
The difficulties among Japanese banks have been analyzed in many papers, 
but few papers are focusing on recent mega-mergers with formal empirical analysis. 
Ito and Sasaki (2002) analyzed how Japanese banks reacted to a falling capital ratio in 
the first half of the 1990s. They showed that the banks with a lower capital ratio 
tended to issue more subordinated debts to increase their capital ratio and made 
commercial loans less than in the past. One important footnote is that until 2002, the 
announced capital ratio did not show the true capital ratio. The discrepancy was due to 
optimistic classifications of NPLs. For example, insufficient reserves toward problem 
loans, use of subordinated debts, and counting tax deferred asset toward tier I capital 
made the Japanese banks’ capital ratio higher than a true core capital ratio. In one 
instance, Long-term Credit Bank of Japan failed in September 1998, despite its strong 
capital ratio, above 11%, in March 1998.     
In the literature on difficulties of the Japanese banking sector in the 1990s, 
several papers are notable. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) painted a bleak picture of the 
relationship between Japanese banks and corporations from the corporate governance 
point of view. Chapters in Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997, 2000) give detailed 
descriptions of the earlier stages of Japanese banking failures. Peek and Posengren 
(1998) investigate the effect of Japanese bank failures in terms of the Japan premium. 
Hoshi and Ito (2004) review the evolution of the regulatory system in Japan from 1998 
to 2004. Sakuragawa and Watanabe (2007) evaluated the Takenaka reform of 2002, 
which was usually credited for the revival of the Japanese banking sector after 2003.     
We argued in Ito and Harada (2005, 2006) that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) 
premiums for Japanese banks can be a new criterion in addition to the Japan premium, 
the NPLs, and the capital adequacy ratio. Other papers analyzing Japanese banks with 
CDS are Ueno and Baba (2006) and Okada (2007).  Ueno and Baba (2006) estimate  9
the default intensity using CDS and find that the default intensities for the banks and 
the government substantially rose in the late 1990s. Okada (2007) uses an event study 
approach to study the reaction of the CDS market and finds that banks in general 
became less efficient after mergers. Ito and Harada (2005, 2006) find that interbank 
premiums do not reflect the soundness of Japanese banks and CDS is an alternative 
measure to see the market participants’ view.   
However, CDS is not traded for companies and institutions that are already in 
financially bad shape. Government affiliated companies and relatively small size 
companies are not traded in CDS market either. With the DD measure, we can evaluate 
those banks which are government affiliated and which are not traded in CDS market. 
The DD is employed as a measure of bank risk because the DD is a comprehensive 
measure of default risk (See Gropp and Moerman(2004), De Nicolo and Tieman 
(2006) and Gropp, Lo Duca and Vesala (2006)). 
Bank failures and mergers and acquisition (M&As) are relatively new 
phenomena in Japan. The first case of a bank failure that prompted assistance from the 
Deposit Insurance Cooperation of Japan was Toho Sogo Bank in 1991. The first listed 
bank failure was Hyogo Bank on August 30, 1995. Since then, many banks including 
some major banks failed, some of which were merged with healthier banks and some 
of which were temporarily nationalized. Harada and Ito (2008) created a list of these 
failed banks.  
Among surviving banks, mergers were a popular step toward restructuring and 
capital strengthening. In the following years large banks opted for creating a holding 
company structure. As examined in Harada and Ito (2008), major banks went through 
complicated mergers and reorganizations in a short period of time. This requires 
whoever analyses the banks’ balance sheets before and after the merger to compare the  10
pre- and post-merger balance sheets very carefully so that assets and liabilities of 
pre-merger banks aggregate into a post-merger assets and liabilities.     
Earlier studies of bank mergers in Japan such as Tachibanaki and Haneda 
(1999) typically relied on profitability and cost indicators pre and post the mergers. 
However, those analyses need information covering a long span of time and the 
evaluation of mergers is looking backwards. Hosono, Sakai, and Tsuru (2007) explored 
the causes and consequences of Japanese banking consolidation mainly what took 
place in the 1990s. They examine major banks, regional banks and shinkin banks. 
Regional banks are classified into first-tier regional banks and second-tier regional 
banks, which are not usually listed. Shinkin banks are also unlisted banks so they 
mainly use financial statement data. As we mentioned, the credibility of financial 
statements of merged banks are sometimes questioned. Further, financial statements 
data are not issued frequently and they have a significant time lag. In this paper, we 
overcome the shortcomings of earlier studies by using information derived from 
market prices (which are more accurate, frequent and timely than that derived from 
other sources). A method, the DD, is used in analyzing Japanese banks and evaluated 
bank performance comprehensively. 
For nonfinancial corporations, the DD has become well known as a 
market-based measure for assessing the default or credit risk. It is only recent that 
the measure is also applied to financial institutions. It is mainly used by 
international organizations and monetary authorities to assess the financial stability 
and to monitor the risk of financial institutions For example, ECB（2005）treats the 
DD as an important forward-looking indicator that can provide early signs of 
financial fragility. In the case of cross-border contagion, the DD can be used as a 
comprehensive measure of default risk (Gropp, Lo-Duca and Vesala (2006), De  11
Nicolo and Tieman (2006)). Chan-Lau and Sy (2006) introduce the concept of the 
distance to capital (DC) that accounts for pre-default regulatory actions such as 
prompt-corrective-actions framework. The distance to insolvency (DI) measures are 
introduced and applied by Danmarks National Bank (2004). The DI is the base from 
which these new measures were derived and it is applied for analyzizing various 
risks such as contagion risk (Duggar and Mitra (2007) and Chan-Lau, Mitra and Ong 
(2007))
3. The default barrier may be consistent with pre-default regulatory actions 
thresholds rather than book value of liabilities because intervention typically occurs 
at positive capital ratios. However, during the period in the analysis, regulatory and 
supervisory system was not consistent and complex. Therefore, our default barrier is 
book value of liabilities. 
As mentioned above, mergers of major city banks took place in the early 
2000s. These mergers were prompted, at least in part, by changes in the supervisory 
environment. In October 2002, the Financial Rehabilitation Program was released by 
Mr. Takenaka, then Minister in charge of the Financial Services Agency (FSA). The 
program urged major banks to apply strictly the existing accounting standard, which 
would increase non-performing loans and associated capital costs, and then to reduce 
the NPL ratio by a half in three years. A logical consequence was to attract new capital 
to make up the loss of existing capital, in order not to fall below the critical Basle 
capital adequacy ratio (8% for internationally-active banks). The FSA forced banks to 
disclose information in a conservative manner, and, if banks fall behind, the 
government was prepared to take over temporarily even a large bank. Some banks 
                                                  
3  Chan-Lau and Sy (2006) argued that the distance-to-capital (DC) measure may be more 
appropriate than the distance-to-capital (DD) measure, since the prompt corrective actions may 
be triggered by the supervisory authority before a bank becomes insolvent.  They calculated 
the DC and DD for Resona and Ashikaga banks before their nationalization in 2003.      12
needed to raise capital quickly, some other merged to become larger, presumably 
taking advantage of scale economies.     
 
3.    Application of the DD to banks   
A critical question in evaluating bank mergers is whether a merged bank, in 
comparison with predecessor banks, will become a financially better bank, a worse 
bank, or just an average, compared to the predecessors. We propose to answer this 
question by examining the DD of the predecessor banks and that of the merged bank.
4 
It would become possible to examine whether a merger of unhealthy banks produces a 
healthy bank. 
The DD is an application of credit risk assessment pioneered by Merton 
(1974) and Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing theory.
5 The model defines a 
default when the book value of liabilities (the default point) of a company is below the 
market value of assets. The point where the book value of liabilities of a company is 
just equal to the market value of assets is called default point. The DD is the number 
of standard deviations away from the default point. The larger the DD, the greater the 
distance of a company from the default point, less the risk or probability of default.   
The option pricing theory determines the asset value and its volatility of a 
company from the observed stock price and stock volatility. Specifically, the level and 
the volatility of assets are calculated with the Black and Scholes (1973) model using 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4  In this paper our method ignores possible default correlation of predecessor banks and 
calculating the joint default probabilities. As an example, when there are three predecessor 
banks, three DDs are calculated separately in order to examine how fragile the predecessors are 
individually and not to examine the likelihood that the three banks will default simultaneously. 
 
5  See Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and Duffie et al (2007) for specific application of the theory. 
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the value and volatility of stocks. Once the asset market value and its volatility are 
known, it is possible to calculate the probability that the asset value declines to the 
default point within a specified time. This probability is the default probability that 
corresponds one to one with the DD.   
Here the DD rather than the default probability is used to examine a merger 
effect.
6. Having the same level of the DD means that the two banks are at the same 
distance (in terms of standard deviation) from its default point respectively and have 
the same level of default risks. Since the DD is a market based measure of distress, it 
contains expectations of market participants and it is forward looking. Gropp, Vesala 
and Vulpes (2006) and Gropp amd Moerman (2004) argue that the DD may be a 
particularly suitable and all-encompassing measure of default risk for banks.   
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where  t V is the market value of the bank’s assets at time t,  t L   is the bank’s liability 
at time t,  A μ is the mean growth rate of  t V ,  A σ is the standard deviation of  A μ , T 
is a time horizon, that is the time until default occurs which is set to one year. This 
assumption is common when particular information about the maturity structure of 
liabilities is not available. If  t L  does not change until  T t +  (i.e.  T t t L L + = ), we 
can interpret the numerator of  t DD  as  ( ) T t T t t L V E + + −log log . This is because V t 
follows a geometric Brownian motion with mean μA and standard deviation σA , 
                                                  
6  Alternatively, the default probability could be used for a similar analysis. The DD 
and default probability, by definition, have negative relationship: when one becomes 
higher, the other becomes lower. However, the DD is more popular in the related 
literature  14
and hence  T t V + log  is distributed as logarithmic normal distribution and distributed 
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The DD is also expressed as follows: 
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where  () std  is standard deviation. Hence,  t DD  and the default probabilities of 
the structural model correspond to each other one for one. These assumptions and 
modeling tell us that a negative DD implies  ( ) T t T t t L V E + + < log log . As the market 
value of the assets follows logarithmic normal distribution, the negative DD means 
that a probability of default  () T t T t L V + + < at time t+T is greater than 0.5. 
t DD   is calculated using the data as follows;  t L   is from the bank’s balance 
sheet and set T equal to one year. In order to estimate A t V μ ,,  a n d   A σ , we use the 
Black and Scholes option price model. 
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T d d A σ − = 1 2                                                      ( 6 )  
Here,  r  is the risk-free rate,  t W  is the market value of equity at time t (stock 
prices times number of shares outstanding),  Φ is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function. In order to estimate  A t V μ ,,  a n d   A σ , we use the following 
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(previous year’s data), then calculate  A
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0 σ . As the next step, we calculate  A






2 ,..., , + − − T t t t V V V  using  A
1 σ . We repeat these steps until the values 
converge. 
In order to compute the DD of a bank, the face value of near-term and 
long-term debts (financial statements) and market prices of the bank’s stock are 
needed. The banking sector, however, has a balance-sheet structure that is quite 
different from non-financial companies. A careful consideration was given to classify 
what can be short-term debts and long-term debts of banks (see Appendix table 1). 
Items are in principle selected in terms of their maturity. Nevertheless the maturity 
may not be really economically relevant. For example, even the term deposits (of 
maturity more than a year) can be withdrawn if depositors forego part of accrued 
interest, so it could become short-term debt in the case of a bank run.
8 We have to 
make several judgments in defining short-term debts by examining each item.   
As mentioned above, the number of the DD is the distance from the default 
point in terms of standard deviation of asset value fluctuation. For example, a DD of 
2.0 means that the default within a year is a two-standard deviation event presuming 
                                                  
8  Interim (a minor of the semi-annual) financial statements of Japanese companies do not 
contain detailed sub-items of time deposits and it is impossible to treat total debt minus time 
deposits as short-term debt.   
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the fluctuation of mark-to-market asset values follows the recent historical value, 
using the current mark-to-market asset value as a starting point. Even if the DD 
becomes zero, it does not mean that the bank fails at that point of time. The zero DD 
means that if short-term debts (liabilities with maturity less than a year) are not rolled 
over and extra profits are not earned, then the bank or the company would exhaust 
assets within a year. The DD being 0.0 or even negative means that the bank will be 
highly likely to fail under no-rollover assumption. However, if the short-term debts are 
rolled over, then it survives on the cash flow basis, although it may become technically 
insolvent. While if short-term debts are called (time deposits withdrawn in a bank run), 
then it may fail at once. If and when the DD of a bank approaches zero, it implies the 
bank is in an extremely vulnerable position. In the event of a bank run, sudden death 
may be certain.   
There have been two accounting methods of merger in Japan. The 
pooling-of-interest method which unites the book value of assets and the book value of 
liabilities of merging banks. In contrast, the market value of assets is used for the 
merged entity. The latter method is preferable for the analysis of the DD. However, the 
former method was the preferred one among the Japanese bank mergers. That makes it 
difficult to measure the market value of their mergers. Our analysis of the DD tries to 
overcome the discontinuity in the data and takes into consideration market evaluation. 
We provide a picture of how banks and financial holding companies performed in 
terms of financial health, measured by the DD, prior to and following mergers.     
 
4. The DD of Japanese banks 
4.1 Data 
Annual balance sheets, income statements, daily stock prices and the number of issued  17
stocks for each bank are obtained from the Nikkei Financial Quest database. Our data 
covers the period of fiscal year 1985 to August 2005. Most mergers took place around 
2000, so that the after-merger period is limited, although our data can describe how the 
DD of major banks behaved over two decades.
9  
  In order to calculate the DD, data on the risk free rate, market capitalization, 
total assets (book value), stock holder’s equity (book value) and short-term liability 
are needed. For the risk free rate, the 3-month Saiken Gensaki rate (or the 3-month 
bond repurchase rate) is used for the period of April 1, 1985 to May 31, 1992, and then 
the 3-month Financial Bill (FB) rate is used for the period of June 1, 1992 to August 
12, 2005. This is because the government short-term paper (FB) yield is only available 
from1992. During the 1980s, bond repurchase was on some days not priced so that 
adjacent values of the risk free rate are used when some values are missing. Market 
capitalization data is defined by daily stock prices (closing price) times the number of 
issued stocks. When the closing stock price is not available, we applied the same 
method; that is, if one day is missing the previous day's data was copied. Several days 
missing; a gradual adjustment using two edge's data, like linear interpolation for 
normal approximation of binomial distributions.   
Regarding accounting data, we examined organizational structure under 
holding companies and a number of subsidiaries included in consolidated financial 
statements.
10 Unconsolidated financial statements of a bank represent the banks’ 
healthiness however in most cases the data is not available because banks are de-listed 
                                                  
9  In our sample, Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group (MTFG) and UFJ Holdings are two separate 
bank holding companies. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and UFJ Bank merged on January 1, 2006 
to form The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. Our data period does not cover this merger.   
 
10  Changes in organizational structure are thoroughly examined in Harada and Ito (2008). 
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when holding companies are listed instead.
11 Most banks do not necessarily report 
their statements unless they issue bonds.   
Consolidated financial statements and income statements are used as an 
alternative as parent companies’ unconsolidated statements do not contain relevant 
information. For Mizuho Bank, Mizuho Corp. Bank, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, UFJ 
Bank, consolidated statements, but for Sumitomo Mitsui Bank, and unconsolidated 
statements are available and used.
12 For the details of short-term liability data, see 
Appendix Table1. 
In our study of the Japanese banking sector between 1985 and 2005, in order 
to separate individual bank merger effects from macro business conditions, we created 
a benchmark bank that are free from any merger event during the sample period.  
Since all major (city) banks went through reorganization, creating financial holding 
companies (FHCs), they would not be appropriate for a continuous benchmark..  For 
benchmark, a group of five largest regional banks, namely, Chiba Bank, Yokohama 
Bank, Shizuoka Bank, Hiroshima Bank and Fukuoka Bank, is selected, because they 
were regarded as sound, and they did not experience any merger.
13 Unconsolidated 
                                                  
11  The difference between Consolidated and Unconsolidated usually is due to including or 
excluding some smaller financial subsidiaries and overseas incorporated subsidiaries. How to 
match balance sheets pre and post is complicated sometimes (especially for Mizuho). At the 
time of merger, some assets (real estate, and good-will values) might be reevaluated, so that 
they may not match. Good-will values are capitalized to boost the capital ratio in some merger 
cases. See Harada and Ito (2008) for detail. 
 
12  Interim (semi-annual) figures are not available until 2001 September so we use full year 
results from 1985 to 2001.  Available items of financial statements in interim figures are 
different. As an example, sub-items of total deposits are not available in interim figures.   
 
13 We know treatments of large regional banks are different from those of city banks. As an 
example, government capital infusions and pressure to reduce NPLs are not the same. However, 
the regional banks are used for comparison. 
As the DD is the measure used in the paper, the same measure is adopted for the benchmark 
for comparing merged banks and non-merged banks. That means, we did not employ another  19
financial statements for each bank are used from March 1985 to March 2005. Daily 
stock prices and the number of issued stocks of these banks are used for the 
benchmark’s market capitalization.   
Obtaining the DD of the benchmark bank is straightforward. The DD for each 
regional bank is calculated as before, and then five DDs in the benchmark group are 
averaged. News which affects the banking sector as a whole is reflected in the 
benchmark as well as merged banks. So by comparing with the benchmark DD, the 
macro economic news can be controlled.       
Our first question is whether a merger is neutral in financial health of banks. 
If a merged bank is just the sum of individual banks, then the merger considered to be 
neutral in terms of financial health. That is, “DD (bank A+ bank B+ bank C) 
pre-merger = DD (new bank) post-merger” is a neutral case, “DD pre-merger > DD 
post-merger” means a value-losing merger, and “DD pre-merger < DD post-merger” 
means a value-creating merger taking advantage of, for example, scale economy.   
A “hypothetical bank” in each merger is a counterfactual bank that is 
calculated by aggregating pre-merged banks’ balance sheets and stock prices during 
the pre-merged period.  The hypothetical, named “DD pre-[bank name]” (that is, the 
DD prior to Mizuho FG, the DD pre-MTFG, the DD pre-UFJ Holdings, and the DD 
pre-SMFG, respectively), is created using combined data of the predecessor banks. If 
the level of the DD of merged banks did not significantly change from the hypothetical 
bank pre-merger, then we regard the merger as not adding any value to financial 
strength. If the DD becomes lower post-merger, then the merger was 
counterproductive, in that the merger made the bank weaker. 
                                                                                                                                                        
methodology such as extracting idiosyncratic factor from separating beta of CAPM for these 
regional banks.  20
       
4.2 The pre and post merger DD 
In this subsection, the level of the pre and post merger DDs are examined using figures. 
The DDs of a hypothetical bank and the merged bank are shown in each graph from 
1985 to 2005.  In figures focusing after 2000, the DD of the benchmark bank, the 
DDs of pre-merger banks are added to compare movements in the level. 
 
4.2.1 Mizuho Financial Group
14 
Basic financial information of banks in the Mizuho Financial Group (Mizuho FG), 
the time period of their stocks being listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and their 
market capitalization are shown in Appendix Table 2.
15  Figure 1-1 is the DD 
pre-Mizuho FG was formed and the DD of Mizuho FG. Figure 1-2 is the DDs of 
each predecessor, the benchmark and the FG of recent years after 2000. The first 
one-year data is needed in the process of calculating the DD, so there are some 
discontinuities in the DD. Our interest is how the DD changed over the whole 
                                                  
14  DKB and Fuji are two independent banks until September 21, 2000. As such, unconsolidated 
financial statements are used until that date. From September 28, 2000 to August 12, 2005 
Mizuho Holdings (Mizuho FG) is a listed company. Regarding financial statements, combined 
financial statements of DKB and Fuji are used until March 2003 because the listed company, 
Mizuho Holdings, is just an ‘umbrella’. From March 2003 consolidated financial statements of 
Mizuho FG are available. 
 
15.  Note about stock price data of Mizuho; the before and after-merger price and the 
post-merger price have different units. They changed the unit. Before the merger, the unit of 
trade was 1,000 shares and after the merger, the unit of trade is 1 share. We have information on 
the number of shares outstanding. We know that the capitalization (price multiplied by shares) 
did not change. Difference in units is considered, however the following fact is not adjusted. 
After the merger, banks formed a holding company structure. The listed shares are for the 
holding company, and the holding company owns 100 percent of each bank as well as other 
financial institutions. Individual cases are different in how the merger was handled. Mizuho 
reorganized three banks (DKB, IBJ, Fuji) into two functional banks (Mizuho and Mizuho 
Corporate) and later they became the subsidiaries of the umbrella holding company, Mizuho 
Holdings.   21
sample period, especially after 2000.   
We have six lines in figure1-2. DKB, Fuji Bank and IBJ were listed until 
September 21, 2000. Then these three banks were delisted and Mizuho Holdings, 
(later Mizuho FG), from March 12, 2003 was listed. The level of the DD of Mizuho 
Holdings after the merger did not significantly change from the DD pre-Mizuho FG, 
which was represented as the Mizuho Predecessor, in Figures 1-2.   
In the 1980s, the DD of pre-Mizuho FG was above 2, ranging from 2 to 7. 
When the stock market bubble burst in the early 1990s, the DD fell toward zero until 
1993. The DD remained positive but low from 1993 to 1997.    From 1997 to spring 
of 1999, during the financial crisis period, the DD approached zero again, and then 
became negative. When the news of the merger was announced on August 20, 1999, 
the DD was deep in the negative territory and the DD suddenly became higher upon 
the merger news.
16  Clearly, the merger news was welcomed  by  investors.  Positive 
DD, however, did not last more than a year and again it became negative before the 
actual merger day. After the merger in Figure 1-2, the level of the DD did not 
improve and was negative until September 2003.
17 On  January  8,  2003, the Mizuho 
group created the Mizuho Financial Group (FG) and Mizuho Holdings became a 
subsidiary of the Mizuho FG, and banks and securities firm became subsidiaries of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16  The negative value comes together with negative asset growth. In theory, the DD should not 
be negative. It is possible to build a restriction in the program and truncate the DD at zero, 
however, we choose to leave it as it shows as the result is the same. Negative value could bring 
us caution and information. 
 
17  Risks associated with leverage for a bank differs from that for a non-financial firm, given the 
different business model. This difference suggests that the higher leverage of a bank relative to 
a non-financial firm may lead to an overstatement of the measured risk of default relative to a 
non-financial firm. With this regard, we recalculated DD values however the results did not 
change much. The DDs of post-merger period of most merged banks were negative. 
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Mizuho Holdings.  Then, Mizuho Holdings was restructured into a subsidiary in 
parallel with other financial institutions on March 12, 2003. During the period of 
restructuring, the DD remained negative. Our analysis of the DD of the Mizuho 
group reveals that their mergers did not produce a healthy bank out of three weak 
banks, despite a brief period of enthusiasm after the merger news announcement.   
 
4.2.2 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group 
Appendix Table 3 shows banks that became parts of the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial 
Group (MTFG), with information of their listed period on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and market capitalization., Two merger events occurred during our sample 
period; one is Mitsubishi Tokyo Bank which is created by the merger of Mitsubishi 
bank and Tokyo bank on April 1, 1996 and the other one is the launch of MTFG on 
April 1, 2001. Figure 2-1 shows the DDs of Mitsubishi and Tokyo from 1986 to 
1996.  The DD of the former merger is measured in Figure 2-2 which covers the 
period 1995 to 1996. The hypothetical bank (BTM Predecessors in the figure) is a 
combined balance sheets of the Mitsubishi Bank and Bank of Tokyo. Figure 2-3 
focus on the period after 2000 and show the DDs of three banks (the DD of BTM, 
the DD of MTFG and the Benchmark DD).     
The level of the DD of Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi in Figure 2-1 rose from 
negative to positive but they were low levels in the latter half of the 1990s and 
improve after their launch in 2001. Before the Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi was 
established, the DD increased towards the merger in 1996. Around the merger time, 
the DD approached 6, a relatively high value. Movements in the DD in general show 
similar patterns with other banks in the 1990s, however, one remarkable feature for 
MTFG is that the DD turned positive when merger news was announced (March 28,  23
1995) and increased towards the day of the merger.  From Figure 2-3, one feature 
of the MTFG is obvious. The DD of MTFG did not become negative after the 
merger or reorganization. This contrasts to other bank groups in our sample. The 
initial enthusiasm after the merger announcement was followed up by a firm belief 
of investors that the merger would be a successful  one.  The  relatively high level of 
the DD shows that MTFG was regarded as a sound bank. In the following years, 
however, the level of the DD of MTFG stayed stable, in contrast to other banks that 
experienced significant improvements.   
 
4.2.3 UFJ Holdings 
UFJ Bank was formed by the merger of Sanwa Bank and Tokai Bank on April 2, 
2001 and UFJ Holdings was established on the same day (see Appendix Table4). 
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 are the DD of banks belonging to UFJ Holdings.  
The merger was announced about one year earlier on June 15, 2000. 
However, the level of the DD did not change noticeably after the announcement. 
When UFJ Holdings was listed, the DD became and remained negative until 
mid-2003. It did not move into a positive territory until MTFG announced the 
forthcoming merger with UFJ Holdings on August 13, 2004. 
After 2000, movements in the DD are similar with that of Mizuho FG. In 
Figure 3-2, there are two spikes, one is around the spring of 2004 and the other is 
during the summer of 2005. These spikes are related to the news of merger with the 
MTFG.  
On May 21, 2004, UFJ Holdings announced it was selling UFJ Trust Bank 
to Sumitomo Trust Bank for 300 billion yen. However, on August 13, 2004, MTFG 
and UFJ Holdings announced that the holding company as a whole would merge  24
with MTFG. The Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group would be formed by the end of 
September 2005. (The new group name, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, was 
announced February 18, 2005.) Although this news had a negative impact on MTFG 
because 0.62 MTFG share was the exchange unit for 1 UFJ share, it had a positive 
impact on the UFJ side.    The market view, shown in DD movements, suggests that 
the merger was in favor for weak UFJ with low DD at the expense of strong MTFG 
with high DD.     
 
4.2.4 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 
For the case of Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMFG), Appendix Table 5 
explains how the two banks are consolidated into SMFG. Figure 4-1 shows the level 
of the DD before SMFG was formed. Figure 4-2 is the DDs of the predecessor, the 
benchmark and the FG after 2000.   
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. (SMBC) was established by the merger of 
Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank on April 1, 2001 (The news was announced on 
October 14, 1999). Therefore the DD of the hypothetical bank, the pre-SMFG, the 
DD which are composed of Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank, covers the period 
from 1985 to March 2001.
18 Later, on December 2, 2002, SMFG was formed and 
SMBC was absorbed by the Financial Group as one of its 100 % subsidiary banks. 
SMBC which is under the SMFG merged with one of its subsidiary banks, Wakashio 
Bank, on March 17, 2003 (The news was announced on December 25, 2002). The 
                                                  
18  Sakura Bank was established in April 1990 by the merger of Mitsui Bank and Taiyo Kobe 
Bank. This merger case is not counted as one event in SMBC because the merger was guided by 
the authorities.   
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complexity of the last merger makes the analysis more difficult in this case.
19  
  The level of the DD suddenly became negative in December 2002 and this 
period is consistent with the announcement of its merger with Wakashio bank. The 
DD of SMBC dropped to zero and became negative when SMFG was listed in 2003.   
 
4.2.5 Summary and Interpretation   
By examining the four merger cases, a common pattern of DD movements among 
Mizuho FG, UFJ Holdings and SMFG is as follows: Their DDs before the merger 
was either in the negative territory or near zero, and after the merger, stayed near 
zero for about one to two years. MTFG was an exceptional case because its DD did 
not turn negative after the merger.   
Three mergers out of four were regarded by the market as if they were 
nearly insolvent financial groups around the merger period. After their mergers, their 
financial health did not improve, at least immediately, according to the DD. The 
market participants were skeptical whether bank mergers would produce synergy 
and scale economies more than just the addition of the two (or three) banks’ balance 
sheets.   
If mergers did not produce the additional value, what could be a motivation 
of a merger? One possibility was that banks merged to become larger knowing, 
rightly or wrongly, that there existed a too-big-to-fail policy. The market was not 
impressed by this.    Spiegel and Yamori (2004) states that the set of banks treated as 
too-big-to-fail were progressively narrowed as the financial situation deteriorated 
                                                  
19  Wakashio bank was established in June 1996 and started operation in September 1996. In 
March 2003 SMBC merged with Wakashio Bank but the merged bank's name became Sumitomo 
Mitsui Banking Corporation. In the merger, unrealized equity losses of SMBC were eliminated. 
See Harada and Ito (2008) for detail.      26
and the funds of the Deposit Insurance Corporation were depleted. Earlier studies 
such as Brewer et al. (2003) find evidence in favor of some “too-big-to-fail” 
protection for large banks but the regulatory advantage of large Japanese banks no 
longer existed at that time. That is, our results with the DD are consistent with the 
findings in Spiegel and Yamori (2004). After the failures of two long-term credit 
banks, Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank, in 1998, the 
market considered that weak banks might fail (and eventually taken over by the 
government) regardless of the asset size. 
Turning to the period from 2003 to 2005, the DD movements of the three 
financial groups, Mizuho FG, UFJ Holdings and SMFG, are very similar. Their DDs 
improved dramatically after 2003. Behind the improvement is the fact that the 
amount of NPLs, which peaked in March 2002, continued to decline steeply until 
March 2005. “The Anti-Deflation Package” and “The Financial Revitalization 
Program” in October 2002 were considered as the impetus for resolving the NPLs.
20 
Stock prices of those merged banks substantially improved as well. All mega banks 
had experienced a turnaround. The results might suggest that it takes for merged 
banks a long time to bear fruits because cost savings by reorganization or system 
integration, avoiding conflicts with workers and customers, could proceed only 
gradually in Japan.   
 
4.3 T-test on the difference of the DD 
In this subsection, we formally test the level of the pre- and post-merger DDs. Two 
                                                  
20  Another turning point was the nationalization of the Resona Bank in May 2003.   
It was nationalized and capital was injected, but the existing shareholders’ value 
was not scrapped, on the assumption that the capital had positive net capital, 
although the capital ratio was below a minimum standard 4%.    27
types of event windows, 250 business days and 500 business days, are examined for 
the changes in the level of the DD, and a paired t-test is conducted on the 
differences between our bank of interest and the benchmark bank.
21 This type of 
t-test is used to compare means on the same subject in differing circumstances 
which are a before and after comparison in the paper. The 250 day event window 
captures approximately one year pre- and post-merger. The 500 day event reveals 
the rather long term effects of mergers as they progress over two years after merger 
and display the effects. 
We compare two paired groups which show the differences between the DD 
of a hypothetical bank and a merged bank, in order to control for news effects which 
affect the banking sector. The hypothesis is that the relative standing of pre- and 
post-merger banks are different. Given two paired sets  i X and  i Y  of  n  observations, 
the paired t-test determines if they differ from each other in a significant way.   
() X X X i i − = ˆ  
() Y Y Y i i − = ˆ  
()











where  i X ˆ displays pre-merger of the DD,  i Y ˆ   shows data post-merger difference. 
 
4.3.1 Mizuho Financial Group 
The average DD of Mizuho FG is smaller than pre- and even post-merger compared 
with the benchmark DD in Table 1. It is 0.517 pre- and -0.743 post-merger for 500 
day window, -0.030 pre- and -0.740 post-merger for 250 day window. Narrowing the 
                                                  
21  Under the paired t-test, it is assumed that the data come from the same subject and does not 
assume that the variance of populations is equal.  28
event window, the DD of Mizuho FG are both negative (-0.030 and -0.740). The 
average DD the merger period is below zero and the soundness of these banks does 
not appeared to have changed even after forming a new financial group. 
  The paired t-test is for the pre- and post-merger difference and specifically, 
the difference between the DD of Mizuho FG and that of the benchmark is 
calculated for both pre- and post-merger differences. For the pre-merger period, the 
difference between the DD of Mizuho Predecessors and that of the benchmark is 
conducted. The null hypothesis of no difference is rejected at the 1% significance 
level (They are -31.66 and -44.36 in Table 5). As the difference is negative, it 
implies that Mizuho FG was considered a weaker bank than large regional banks.   
 
4.3.2 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group 
In Table 2, event 1 is the merger of Mitsubishi Bank and Tokyo Bank in 1996 and 
event 2 is the merger of MTFG. Our results were basically the same in both events. 
The average DDs of Mitsubishi Bank and MTFG are mostly larger than that 
of the pre- and post-merger DDs of the benchmark bank. This is an outstanding 
difference because no merger event improved the level of the DD except the case of 
this group. For event 2, the average DD for benchmark is 1.972 pre-merger and 
1.721 post-merger and those of MTFG are 0.637 and 1.659 in 500 day window, and 
0.192 and 1.642 in 250 day window. It shows that launching MTFG was a positively 
evaluated and it lessened the default probability of the bank. 
The paired t-test for MTFG is also significant at 1% level and the difference 
is statistically significant pre- and post-merger periods. However, the magnitude of 
difference itself is smaller when compared with other banks. They are for example 
                                                                                                                                                        
  29
-25.6 and -9.1 for the establishment of MTFG (event 2) in Table5.   
 
4.3.3 UFJ Holdings 
The average DD of UFJ Holdings in Table 3 is quite similar to the case of Mizuho 
FG. The level of the DD became smaller pre- and post-the merger compared with the 
benchmark bank. It is 0.384 before the merger and -0.857 after the merger for the 
500 day window; and 0.454 before the merger and -1.868 after the merger in the 250 
day window. The DD for the benchmark bank was stable during the period but 
sharply lowered after the launch of UFJ Holdings. The average DD was below zero 
after the event. These results are consistent with that the core bank of UFJ Holdings, 
Sanwa bank had a huge amount of NPLs and their asset quality was poor compared 
with other banks. Our result implies that the default risk of UFJ Holdings did not 
improve by the merger.   
The results of paired t-test are -70.44 and -24.29 for UFJ Holdings in Table 
5. Again, the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected at the 1% significance level. 
As the difference was negative, UFJ Holdings was also considered a weaker bank 
than major regional banks. 
 
4.3.4 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group     
The average DD of SMFG is smaller than that of benchmark bank after the merger. 
(Table 4). The result is similar with those of Mizuho FG and UFJ Holdings. That is, 
the average DD became smaller in the latter half of the event window and was 
smaller than that of the benchmark bank.   
The paired t-test for SMFG is significant at 1% level. Again the result is 
similar to Mizuho FG and UFJ Holdings. The pre and post-merger performances of  30
these banks were different (Table 5). All in all, our results support the view that 
mergers did not create healthier banks for these banks, or, at least, so perceived by 
the market. The difference of the DD for pre- and post-merger periods was 
significantly different for all banks and that implies the performance of the DD of 




The paper examines whether or not bank mergers in the late 1990s and 2000s 
enhanced their financial soundness and helped banks escape from failure. Banks are 
considered to be fragile and heading toward failure, when their capital base is 
eroded, when a large portion of their loan is nonperforming, and/or when potential 
losses from other sources are apparent. One way to enhance capital is to raise 
profitability, and one way to enhance profitability is to merge with another bank and 
take advantage of scale economies, by eliminating duplicating costs and making 
synergy to work. Between 1997 and 2003, many banks attempted to enhance their 
capital base via mergers. Some mergers were genuinely attempting to achieve scale 
economies, while others seemed to put priority to get bigger. Yet, a few cases 
seemed to take advantage of accounting tricks involving realizing going-concern 
values on books.   
Our results show that financial soundness of a merged bank depended 
heavily on that of the pre-merged banks. Mergers do not automatically guarantee 
improvement of banks’ financial health, as the level of the DD did not rise after the 
merger in three out of four cases in our sample. A merger of sound banks produces a 
sound merged bank, but adding two weak banks did not produce a strong bank.  31
Mergers did not help lessen the probability of failure (with a notable exception of 
MTFG). On of the reasons for this result is that Japanese banks chose “equal 
merger”, as opposed to takeovers, and that limited a scope of serious restructuring 
after mergers. Also the merger accounting method used was based on a method that 
is not a widely accepted abroad. These facts would explain the behavior of the DD. 
In addition, not only did the merger produce similar DDs of the pre-merged 
banks, but a merged bank often experienced the negative DD right after the merger. 
These findings are consistent with the view that mergers were not motivated by a 
desire and determination to restore sound banking, at least so perceived by the 
market.  
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Mizuho Predecessors Mizuho FG
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Benchmark DKB Fuji IBJ Mizuho Predecessors Mizuho FG
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BTM Predecessors BTM MTFG
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Benchmark BTM Predecessors BTM
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Benchmark Sanwa Tokai UFJ Predecessors UFJHD
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1998/9/10 2000/9/21 2001/9/26 2003/10/7
benchmark
Mizuho 
Table2: Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group
Event 1: Event window 500days




1995/3/22 1996/3/22 1996/3/26 1997/3/31
benchmark
BTM
Event 2:Event window 500days






































2000/3/22 2001/3/26 2002/4/1 2003/4/4
benchmark
UFJ
Table4:Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group
Event window 500days


























BTM event1 -86.86 ***




BTM event1 -40.71 ***







Appendix Table1: Short term and long term liablity of banks
Short term liability Long term liability
Deposits Debentures
Negotiable certificates of deposit Straight bonds
Call money Convertible bonds
Payables under repurchase agreements Due to trust accounts








Reserve for employeeｓ' bonus
Reserve for directors' bonus
Other reserves
Reserves under special laws
Deferred tax liabilities
Deferred tax liabilities for land revaluation
Acceptances and guarantees
Note1: Deposits include Current deposits, Ordinary deposits, Savings deposits, Deposits at notice, Time
deposits and Installment savings.
Note2: Trading liabilities include Trading securities sold for short sales, Derivatives of trading securities,
Securities related to trading transactions sold for short sales, Derivatives of securities related to trading
transactions and Trading-related financial derivatives.
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Appendix Table2: Mizuho Financial Group
Name DD period Stock price period Financial statement period
DKB Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2000
Fuji　Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2000
IBJ Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2000
Mizuho Predecessors (DKB+Fuji+IBJ)
(DKB+Fuji+IBJ) Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2000




  March  2000 to March 2005
Appendix Table 3: Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group
Name DD period Stock price period Financial statement period
BTM Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2001
Tokyo March 31, 1986 to March 21,
2001
April 1, 1985 to March 21,
2001
Tokyo Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 1996
MTFG Predecessors (Mitsubishi+Tokyo)
(Mitsubishi+Tokyo) Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 1996
MTFG Consolidated
September 2001 to March
2005. Financial statement of
March 2001 is not available
due to the consolidation.
MTFG April 1, 2001 to August 12,
2005
April 1, 2001 to August 12,
2005
BTM March 31, 1986 to March 21,
2001
April 1, 1985 to March 21,
2001
March 31, 1986 to March 21,
2001
April 1, 1985 to March 21,
2001
Mizuho FG September 26, 2001 to August
12, 2005. DD is not available
from March 6, 2003 to March
11, 2003 due to the structural
change from Mizuho HDs to
Mizuho FG.
IBJ March 31, 1986 to September
21, 2000
April 1, 1985 to September
21, 2000
March 31, 1986 to September
21, 2000
April 1, 1985 to September
21, 2000
DKB March 31, 1986 to September
21, 2000
April 1, 1985 to September
21, 2000
Fuji March 31, 1986 to September
21, 2000
April 1, 1985 to September
21, 2000
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Appendix Table 4: UFJ Holdings
Name DD period Stock price period Financial statement period
Sanwa Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2001
Tokai Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2001
UFJ Predecessors (Sanwa+Tokai)
(Sanwa+Tokai) Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2001
UFJHD Consolidated
September 2001 to March
2005 Financial statement of
March 2001 is not available
due to the consolidation.
Appendix Table 5: Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group
Name DD period Stock price period Financial statement period
Sumitomo ( later SMBC then
SMFG)
March 31, 1986 to August 12,
2005




November 26, 2002 to
December 1, 2002 DD is not
available as the stock price is
and December 2, 2002 to
August 12, 2005




March 2003 to March 2005
Financial statement of March
2001 is not available due to
the consolidation.
Sakura Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 2001
Unconsolidated
March 1985 to March 1990
SMBC Predecessors (Sumitomo+Sakura)
(Sumitomo+Sakura) Unconsolidated  March
1985 to March 2001
TaiyoKobe March 31 1986 to March 23
1990
April 1 1985 to March 23
1990
March 31 1986 to March 26
2001
April 1 1985 to March 26
2001
UFJHD April 1, 2001 to August 12,
2005
April 1, 2001 to August 12,
2005
Sakura March 31 1986 to March 26
2001
April 1 1985 to March 26
2001
Tokai March 31, 1986 to March 26,
2001
April 1, 1985 to March 26,
2001
March 31, 1986 to March 26,
2001
April 1, 1985 to March 26,
2001
Sanwa March 31, 1986 to March 26,
2001
April 1, 1985 to March 26,
2001
 
 